Workers\u27 Rights Against a Bankrupt Employer by Lowndes, Nancy L.
William & Mary Law Review 
Volume 26 (1984-1985) 
Issue 3 Article 6 
April 1985 
Workers' Rights Against a Bankrupt Employer 
Nancy L. Lowndes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Nancy L. Lowndes, Workers' Rights Against a Bankrupt Employer, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 545 
(1985), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/6 
Copyright c 1985 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
WORKERS' RIGHTS AGAINST A BANKRUPT EMPLOYER
A conflict exists between the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act' and section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978 (the Bankruptcy Code).' The Norris-LaGuardia
Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining strikes and other labor
activities arising out of labor disputes,3 except under specified cir-
cumstances.4 Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code stays credi-
tors from most collection activities against a debtor who has filed a
petition for bankruptcy under the Code.6 The conflict between the
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982).
3. Section 113(c) of the Act defines "labor dispute." It states:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of per-
sons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, charging, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982).
4. Section 107 of the Act permits the federal courts to enjoin labor activities for specified
reasons, including the threat of unlawful action or the likelihood that irreparable damage to
the employer's property will follow. 29 U.S.C. § 107(a)-(e) (1982).
5. Section 362(a) states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application fied under section
5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of
the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before commence-
ment of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before commencement of the case under this title;
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two statutes arises when a labor union pickets or strikes a bank-
rupt employer because the employer failed to make benefit pay-
ments to the union fund as required under the parties' collective
bargaining agreement.
This is not the first conflict to arise between the new Bank-
ruptcy Code and the labor laws. Section 365(a) of the Code permits
a debtor to reject burdensome executory contracts with the bank-
ruptcy court's approval, and courts consistently have treated col-
lective bargaining agreements as executory contracts within the
meaning of the statute.' Consequently, section 365(a) conflicted
with sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act,
which impose a duty on the employer to bargain collectively and to
establish procedures for modifying or terminating a labor con-
tract.7 The United States Supreme Court resolved this conflict in
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,8 holding that bankruptcy law pre-
vailed over labor law in this situation.9 Congress substantially
overruled this decision in the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code. 10
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
Section 362(b) exempts certain collection activities from the stay, such as criminal pro-
ceedings, alimony proceedings, and certain governmental actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)-(8)
(1982).
6. See In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), af'd, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984); Brother-
hood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975); Shipmen's
Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d) (1982).
8. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
9. Id. at 1194-1201. In Bildisco, the Court held that the bankruptcy court should permit
the employer to reject a collective bargaining agreement under section 365(a) of the Code if
the employer can show that the contract is burdensome and if the court concludes that, on
balance, the equities favor rejection of the agreement. Id. at 1196. More importantly, the
Court held that a bankrupt employer may unilaterally reject or modify a labor contract
before formal rejection by the bankruptcy court without committing an unfair labor practice
because the contract becomes unenforceable when the employer files the bankruptcy peti-
tion. Id. at 1199-1201.
10. Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 541, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 333, 390 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113).
546
WORKERS' RIGHTS
In two circuit court cases involving the conflict between the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act and section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, In
re Petrusch" and In re Crowe & Associates, 2 the respective bank-
ruptcy courts reached conclusions opposite from those reached by
the district courts that reviewed their decisions. In Petrusch, the
employer had signed several collective bargaining agreements with
the union in 1974 and 1976. The agreements obligated the em-
ployer to make fringe-benefit contributions to the union's health
and pension funds. By July 1980 when the employer filed a chapter
13 petition for bankruptcy, the payments to the union's funds had
become delinquent. When the employer failed to comply with the
union's demand for contributions, the union picketed.13
Like the employer in Petrusch, the employer in Crowe had a col-
lective bargaining agreement with its employees' union that re-
quired the company to make periodic payments to the union's pen-
sion fund. On the date the employer filed a voluntary chapter 11
petition, the company was delinquent in its payments to the pen-
sion fund. After the employer fied the petition, the union de-
manded that the employer satisfy the debt. When the employer
failed to do so, the union struck.1
4
In both Petrusch and Crowe, the employers sought injunctions
in bankruptcy court against the labor activities, arguing that the
unions were engaged in collection activities in violation of the au-
tomatic stay that went into effect when the employers filed for
bankruptcy,"5 and in both cases the bankruptcy courts granted the
injunctions."6 Both district courts, however, reversed on appeal.
17
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Sixth Cir-
The 1984 amendments largely reverse the Bildisco decision. Under the new section 1113, a
bankruptcy court may still approve an application to reject a collective bargaining agree-
ment if certain conditions are met. However, subsection (f) expressly provides that a collec-
tive bargaining agreement may not be terminated unilaterally until the debtor has complied
with all of the provisions under this section. 11 U.S.CA § 1113 (West Supp. 1984).
11. 667 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 974 (1982).
12. 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
13. Petrusch, 14 Bankr. 825, 826-27 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 667 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 974 (1982).
14. Crowe, 713 F.2d at 212-13.
15. Petrusch, 667 F.2d at 298-99; Crowe, 713 F.2d at 211.
16. Crowe, 16 Bankr. 271, 273-74 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981); Petrusch, 14 Bankr. 825, 827.
17. Crowe, 20 Bankr. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Petrusch, 14 Bankr. 825.
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cuits affirmed the district courts' rulings, holding that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to issue
the injunctions.'
This Note examines the backgrounds of both the Norris-La-
Guardia Act and the Bankruptcy Reform Act and discusses their
underlying policies. The Note also reviews federal case law involv-
ing the Norris-LaGuardia Act and analyzes the courts' treatment
of the conflict between these two statutes. The Note concludes that
federal courts should not issue injunctions in these cases because
they lack of subject matter jurisdiction to do so.
THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978 AND THE NORRIS-
LAGUARDIA ACT: BACKGROUND AND POLICIES
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the Automatic Stay
Provision
In 1970, Congress established the Commission on the Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States. Congress directed the Commis-
sion to study the current bankruptcy laws and recommend changes
to the bankruptcy system.19 The bankruptcy system was first es-
tablished in 1898 and had its only major revision in 1938.0 In light
of the significant changes in debtor-creditor law since 1938,
brought about by the widespread adoption of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the increased use of consumer credit, the Com-
mission determined that the bankruptcy system was wholly un-
suited to handle complex modern problems.21 The Commission's
report revealed two major weaknesses in the bankrutpcy laws: the
structure and procedures of the bankruptcy court system and the
inadequacy of relief provided for consumer debtors.22
Congress' remedy for the weaknesses in the bankruptcy court
system was to discard the former referee system and to establish a
18. Crowe, 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983); Petrusch, 667 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1981).
19. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963.
20. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5965.
21. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5788.
22. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 19, at 4, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 19, at 5965-
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bankruptcy court in each federal judicial district to serve as an ad-
junct to the district court.23 Congress significantly broadened the
bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction to include all civil proceedings aris-
ing under or related to cases under title 11.24
The United States Supreme Court held that this system was un-
constitutional, however, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co. 25 The Court ruled that because the bank-
ruptcy judges were not granted the protections afforded to judges
under article III of the United States Constitution, they could not
legally exercise all of the powers granted to them under the Code.26
The Court directed Congress either to establish a bankruptcy court
system that would comply with constitutional mandates or to
adopt another method for adjudicating bankruptcy cases.27
After considerable delay, Congress responded to the Northern
Pipeline decision by enacting the Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.28
Under the new Act, the bankruptcy courts have article I status and
are designated as units of the district courts.29 Bankruptcy judges
may hear and determine all cases arising under title 11 that are
referred by the district courts, but the bankruptcy courts are more
restricted in their authority to adjudicate other matters related to
title 11 cases. 3
0
The Bankruptcy Code is divided into seven chapters: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9,
11, and 13. 31 Chapters 1, 3, and 5 generally apply to all cases filed
under chapters 7, 9, 11, and 13,2 while cases may be fied only
under one of the latter four chapters.3 3 Chapter 7 governs the basic
liquidation or "straight bankruptcy" proceedings." Chapter 9 pro-
23. 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1982).
25. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 88.
28. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 104(a), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 336-41 (to
be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-58).
29. 28 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1985).
30. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West Supp. 1985).
31. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982).
32. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 19, at 6, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 19, at 5967.
33. Id. The Code also permits cases to be converted from one chapter to another. Id.
34. Ginsberg, Introduction to the Symposium: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-A
Primer, 28 DEPAuL L. REV. 923, 926 (1979).
19851 549
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
vides for the adjustment of a municipality's debts.35 Chapters 11
and 13, the chapters primarily affecting the conflict discussed in
this Note, govern private business and individual reorganization.3
Chapter 11, the business reorganization chapter, provides for the
rehabilitation of a financially distressed business through adjust-
ment of both its debts and its equity interests. 7 The House Report
explains this chapter's purpose:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquida-
tion case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may
continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its
creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise
of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for pro-
duction in the industry for which they were designed are more
valuable than those same assets sold for scrap .... If the busi-
ness can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be returned to a
viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize than
to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets."'
Chapter 13 permits almost any individual or small business with
regular income to propose a plan for repayment of debts under
court supervision and protection. The plan may require full or
partial repayment to creditors.40
One of the most important features of the new Bankruptcy Code
is section 362(a), the automatic stay provision. 41 A petition filed
under any chapter of the Code immediately triggers the stay,
which prevents creditors from engaging in most collection activi-
ties.42 Although the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provided an
automatic stay under previous law, the new Code broadens the
scope of the stay and also imposes limitations not found in the
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (1982).
36. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74, 1301-30 (1982).
37. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 21, at 9, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 21, at 5795.
38. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 19, at 220, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 19, at
6179.
39. Id. at 119, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6079-80. To be eligible for chapter 13
protection, the individual or small business must have sufficiently stable income to be able
to make payments under the plan.
40. Id. at 118, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6079.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982); see supra notes 2 & 5.
42. See supra note 5; see also Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy
Law, 12 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 3, 10 (1978).
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previous law.43 Section 362(b) states eight exceptions to the auto-
matic stay provision, including commencement or continuation of
criminal proceedings against the debtor and collection of ali-
mony.44 Labor activities are not exempted from the stay
specifically.
The scope of the automatic stay is extremely broad and, aside
from the exceptions listed in subsection (b), the provision applies
to almost any type of formal or informal action against the debtor
or his property.45 The stay applies only to prepetition claims
against the debtor or his estate, however, and does not extend to
claims that arise after the bankruptcy procedures begin. The Code
excludes postpetition claims because a stay in those situations
would discourage others from dealing with the debtor.46
Subsection (d) of the automatic stay provision directs the court
to grant relief from the stay at the request of a party in interest for
"cause," including the lack of adequate protection of a property
interest.4 The court also must grant relief from the stay for an act
against property if two conditions are present: (1) the debtor does
not have an equity in the property; and (2) such property is not
necessary to an effective reorganization.4 8 The legislative history
indicates that relief may be granted for causes not specified in the
statute, including cases in which the stay would cause the creditor
49irreparable injury.
The automatic stay is one of the debtor's most fundamental pro-
tections under the Bankruptcy Code.50 The stay protects individu-
43. See Kennedy, supra note 42, at 10.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1), (2) (1982).
45. 2 COLTER ON BANKRuPTcy (MB) % 362.04, at V 362-27 (15th ed. 1979).
46. Id. at % 362-28.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1982).
49. HR. REP. No. 595, supra note 19, at 122, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 19, at
6083. The report lists cases in which a codebtor is deteriorating financially or is about to
leave the jurisdiction as examples of cases in which the stay could cause irreparable injury
to the creditor.
50. The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by
the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It
stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It per-
mits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be
relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
HR. REP. No. 595, supra note 19, at 340, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 19, at 6296-97.
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als from harassment by bill collectors and gives failing businesses
opportunities to work out viable repayment schedules."1 The stay
also protects creditors by providing an orderly liquidation or re-
payment procedure that prevents creditors who act first from ob-
taining payment of their claims in preference to other creditors.
52
Thus, the automatic stay provision advances two major policies of
the bankruptcy laws: fresh starts for debtors, and equal treatment
of creditors.53
The Norris-LaGuardia Act
Congress' enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia. Act was a direct
response to the federal courts' practice of issuing injunctions
against the activities of organized labor.54 After passage of the
Sherman Act,55 federal courts enjoined labor strikes on the theory
that they were illegal conspiracies in restraint of trade.56 In re-
sponse,57 Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914.58 Section 6 of
the Clayton Act stated that the antitrust laws were not to be inter-
preted as forbidding the existence of labor organizations, nor were
such organizations to be considered illegal conspiracies in restraint
of trade.59 More importantly, section 20 explicitly forbade the fed-
eral courts to order injunctions in any cases between employers
and employees arising out of disputes concerning the terms or con-
51. Id. at 174, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6135.
52. Id. at 340, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6297.
53. Kennedy, supra note 42, at 61; see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 45, at 1 362-17.
54. This bill comes as a popular protest and as an additional protection to Ameri-
can citizens against the abuse of the equity powers of the Federal courts. Labor
is criticized and denounced in connection with the discussion of this bill. Labor
is not responsible for this bill. The responsibility is upon those who invoked an
abusive exercise of judicial power and upon those Federal judges who abusively
exercised their powers.
75 CONG. REC. 5500 (1932) (statement of Rep. Sumners); see also Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219 (1940).
55. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
56. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38
(1904).
57. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 9-10 (1930).
58. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982)).
59. Id. at 731, § 6 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982)).
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ditions of employment.6 0
Despite these provisions, later federal court decisions deter-
mined that the Clayton Act did not completely prevent injunctions
in labor disputes. The United States Supreme Court in Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering,el condemned a secondary boycott on
antitrust grounds, holding that section 6 of the Clayton Act was
inapplicable when unions "depart from.., normal and legitimate
objects. ' 62 The Court also held that section 20 was inapplicable be-
cause that proviso protected only workers who stood in proximate
relation as employees to the primary employer.6 It then concluded
that the Clayton Act did not deprive federal courts of the jurisdic-
tion to issue injunctions under these circumstances."
The legislative history clearly indicates that the passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 was an expression of Congress' dis-
approval of the narrow construction given to the Clayton Act in
cases such as Duplex Printing Press.5 In an effort to aid judicial
construction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,6 6 Congress included a
declaration of policy on the rights of labor.6 7 Congress intended the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to serve two primary purposes: (1) to pro-
tect the right of workers to exercise organized economic power, a
necessary tool for effective collective bargaining; and (2) to prevent
federal court injunctions from interfering with the "natural inter-
60. Id. at 738, § 20 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)).
61. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
62. Id. at 469.
63. Id. at 471-74.
64. Id. at 478.
65. "If the courts had been satisfied to construe the law as enacted by Congress, there
would not be any need of legislation of this kind ... . If the courts had not emasculated
and purposely misconstrued the Clayton Act, we would not today be discussing an anti-
injunction bill." 75 CONG. REc. 5478 (1932) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).
66. See 75 CONG. REC. 4503 (1932).
67. Section 102 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states, in part,
[Because] the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor. .. it is neces-
sary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of
his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such rep-
resentatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . ...
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
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play of the competing economic forces of labor and capital." 8
Aware of the policies underlying the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, the courts in
Petrusch and Crowe looked to the case law decided under the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act.
THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT: AN HISTORIC OVERVIEW
The federal courts consistently have given the Norris-LaGuardia
Act a broad interpretation. In Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local
No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products Inc., 9 decided shortly after
the Act's passage, the Supreme Court recognized that the Act was
"intended drastically to curtail the equity jurisdiction of federal
courts in the field of labor disputes."70 Accordingly, injunctions
against labor union activity were clearly inconsistent with congres-
sional intent.7 1 Forty years later, in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals,
Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Association,7 2 the Court reit-
erated this interpretation, noting that Congress had intended to
prevent judicial scrutiny into the "legitimacy" of the union's objec-
tives.7 3 With only a few narrow exceptions, courts have extended
this broad interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's anti-in-
junction provisions to situations in which the union's concerted ac-
tivities were illegal under other, nonlabor statutes, as well as the
prior bankruptcy laws.
Conflicts With Nonlabor Statutes
In Milk Wagon Drivers, the milk deliverers' union picketed cut-
rate milk stores employing a new sales system that depressed labor
standards and caused union members to lose their jobs. 74 The
plaintiff dairies sought an injunction, alleging that the union and
68. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957).
Another important purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to outlaw the "yellow dog"
contract. Under these contracts, employees were required to agree, as a condition of employ-
ment, not to join a union. See 75 CoNG. REc. 4504 (1932).
69. 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
70. Id. at 101.
71. Id. at 103.
72. 457 U.S. 702 (1982).
73. Id. at 715.
74. 311 U.S. 91, 94-96 (1940).
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its officers had conspired to restrain interstate commerce in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act."5 Reversing the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court ruled that an
injunction could not issue.76 Although the complaint alleged viola-
tions of the Sherman Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the
federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in cases arising
out of labor disputes.
77
In Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway,78 the railroad union threatened to strike because the com-
pany refused to include in the collective bargaining agreements an
amendment which would have forbidden the company to abolish
any employment position without union approval.7 9 The proposed
amendment stemmed from the company's plan to centralize cer-
tain stations throughout four states and to abolish others. The rail-
road argued that decreases in its business made maintenance of
many of these stations wasteful and therefore contrary to the In-
terstate Commerce Act's policy of efficiency. 80 The Supreme Court
rejected the railroad's argument. The Court refused to limit the
scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act absent an explicit mandate in
the Interstate Commerce Act.81
Conflicts with Prior Bankruptcy Laws
Although Petrusch and Crowe are the first cases in which the
federal courts have faced the conflict between the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act and the automatic stay provision of the new Bankruptcy
Code, conflicts between the Act and the bankruptcy laws are not
new. In In re Third Avenue Transit Corp.,e2 for example, the
union struck after the employer refused to comply with its demand
75. Id. at 96.
76. Id. at 103.
77. Id.
78. 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
79. Id. at 331-32.
80. Id. at 332-33.
81. Id. at 342; see also Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365
(1960). The Court stated that even if the union's picketing was unlawful under another
statute, "it would not follow that the federal court would have jurisdiction to enjoin the
particular conduct which § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act declared shall not be enjoined."
Id. at 371.
82. 192 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1951).
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for a change in the parties' collective bargaining agreement." The
employer was reorganizing under chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act
and, at the employer's request, the reorganization court issued a
temporary injunction against the strike.84 The district court denied
the union's motion to vacate the temporary injunction and the
union appealed. 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, holding that the lower courts lacked jurisdic-
tion to issue the injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.8 6 The
court concluded that "the well established power of the reorganiza-
tion court to issue orders necessary to conserve the property in its
custody must be exercised within the scope of a jurisdiction which
is limited by the broad and explicit language of the Norris LaGuar-
dia [sic] Act."8
Similarly, in Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. The Bohack
Corp.,88 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
invalidated a temporary restraining order issued by the lower court
that enjoined a labor strike against a chapter 11 debtor.89 The
union had struck to protest the employer's discharge of most of its
union-member employees.9 0 Although the court acknowledged that
allowing the picketing to continue might put the debtor out of bus-
iness, it noted that "the policy of our labor laws is simply to pro-
vide rules for the handling of labor disputes, not to prohibit the
use of economic power in the resolution of such disputes. By filing
under Chapter XI an employer does not become clothed in immu-
nity from union action."'91 The court added that the injunction was
not necessary, because the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding
could seek release from "unlivable conditions" in a collective bar-
83. Id. at 972-73.
84. Id. at 973.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976).
89. Id. at 318. Also at issue in the case was whether the bankruptcy court should grant
the debtor's request to reject its collective bargaining agreement with the union. Although
the contract had expired by the time of the Second Circuit's decision, the court remanded
the case for resolution of this issue because that determination would still affect the union's
rights against the debtor. Id. at 321.
90. Id. at 314-15.
91. Id. at 318.
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gaining agreement by petitioning the court for permission to reject
the contract.92
Judicial Exceptions to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
Although the federal courts generally have interpreted broadly
the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
have adhered strictly to its ban on injunctions in labor disputes,
the Supreme Court has carved out narrow exceptions to the Act. In
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana
Railroad,93 the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision per-
mitting a permanent injunction against the railroad union's
strike.e4 When negotiations between the parties failed, the union
called a strike. A mediator from the National Mediation Board was
unsuccessful in resolving the controversy, and the railroad then
submitted the dispute to the Adjustment Board. The union or-
dered a strike four days later.95 Under section 3 of the Railway
Labor Act, 6 minor disputes could be submitted by either party to
an Adjustment Board created under the Act.97 The awards of this
Board are "final and binding" upon both parties.98 The importance
of the public services performed by railroads made this dispute
settling provision necessary. 9
In light of these considerations, the Court held that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act did not forbid the federal courts to issue an injunc-
92. Id.
93. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982).
97. Section 153, subsection (i) of the Railway Labor Act provides:
The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or
carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including
cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual
manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated
to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the
disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the
appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts
and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.
45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1982).
98. Id. § 153(m) (1982).
99. Railroad Trainmen, 353 U.S. at 38.
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tion against the proposed strike."0 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court observed that the purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia and
Railway Labor Acts were reconcilable because both were enacted
as part of a "pattern of labor legislation.'' 101 Thus, unlike earlier
cases in which the Court refused to lift the Norris-LaGuardia Act's
ban on federal injunctions because the conduct was unlawful under
another statute,10 2 the Court reasoned that its decision here would
accommodate both statutes and further Congress' overall labor
policies.103
The Supreme Court created another exception to the Norris-La-
Guardia Act in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770.'04 In Boys Markets the collective bargaining agreement con-
tained a no-strike clause and provided that all controversies in-
volving the contract's interpretation or application would be re-
solved by specified arbitration procedures. 0 5 The dispute between
the employer and the union arose when a supervisor and some
members of his crew who were not members of the bargaining unit
began to rearrange merchandise in the employer's supermarket. A
union representative demanded that the merchandise be removed
and the food cases be restocked by union personnel. When the em-
ployer refused, the union called a strike and began picketing. 0 6
The district court issued an injunction against the strike that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated.
10 7
The Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court's decision,
however, concluding that the injunction was permissible despite
the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 0 8 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that labor organizations
are much stronger today than at the time Congress enacted the
100. Id. at 42.
101. Id. at 40-42.
102. Id. at 42 n.25.
103. Id. at 42.
104. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
105. Id. at 238-39.
106. Id. at 239.
107. Id. at 238. Collective bargaining agreements are enforceable under section 301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act, which provides federal courts with jurisdiction to
hear cases involving violations of labor contracts between employers and unions. 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1982).
108. 398 U.S. at 238, 253.
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Norris-LaGuardia Act. Consequently, congressional concern has
shifted from protection of the fledgling labor movement to encour-
agement of collective bargaining and adherence to administrative
procedures for resolving labor disputes. 0 9 Because Congress en-
acted new labor laws without extensive revision of the older stat-
utes, the Court recognized that courts must accommodate and rec-
oncile the older and the newer statutes.1 0
In holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not bar injunc-
tions under the circumstances present in Boys Markets, the Court
reasoned that the Act's central purpose--"to foster the growth and
viability of labor organizations"-would be advanced rather than
retarded by permitting federal courts to enforce obligations that
unions freely assumed."' Despite these rather sweeping state-
ments, however, the Court cautioned against a broad interpreta-
tion of Boys Markets, explaining that the holding was a narrow
one that was not intended to undermine the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.
112
LABOR'S RIGHTS VERSUS PROTECTION OF THE DEBTOR: THE
COURTS' RESPONSE
In re Petrusch
In Petrusch, the bankruptcy judge enjoined the union from pick-
eting the debtor's business because the union's actions rendered
the debtor unable to comply with its chapter 13 repayment sched-
ule." 3 The union then asked the district court to stay the injunc-
tion on the grounds that the Norris-LaGuardia Act denied bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction to issue the injunction." 4
109. Id. at 250-51.
110. Id. at 251-52 (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R.,
353 U.S. 30 (1957) as the leading example of this "accommodation process").
111. 398 U.S. at 252-53.
112. Id. at 253. The Court later demonstrated the limited nature of the Boys Markets
exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act in a factually similar case, Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). The Court refused to apply the Boys
Markets exception despite the presence of a similar no-strike collective bargaining agree-
ment between the employer and the union on the ground that the strike was not over any
dispute that was subject to the labor contract's arbitration provision. Id. at 407-08.
113. In re Petrusch, 14 Bankr. 825, 827 (N.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 667 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 974 (1982).
114. Id.
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The district court first concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
applied because the case involved a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of the Act." 5 It then held that the jurisdictional mandates
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act took precedence over the bankruptcy
court's power to stay creditors under the new Code. The bank-
ruptcy court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin
the picketing.1 6 The court also ruled that this case did not fit
within the narrow exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act created
in Boys Markets."
7
In affirming the district court's decision, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the case involved a
"labor dispute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act."18 Accordingly,
the court reasoned that the Act deprived federal courts of jurisdic-
tion to enjoin union activities unless the automatic stay provision
of the Bankruptcy Code represented an exception to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act."' After observing that the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 makes no reference to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the court concluded that this silence was "self-evi-
dent proof" that Congress did not intend the automatic stay provi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Code to supersede the Act. Therefore, the
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction.
2 0
In re Crowe & Associates
In Crowe, the bankruptcy court granted the employer injunctive
relief on the theory that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was inapplica-
ble because the case did not involve a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of the Act.' 12 The bankruptcy court also concluded that
even if the parties were involved in a dispute concerning the
amount or existence of the prepetition debt, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act would not prohibit the court from granting the injunction be-
cause the strike was "unlawful," and if continued would probably
115. Id. at 828.
116. Id. at 829.
117. Id. at 830.
118. In re Petrusch, 667 F.2d 297, 299 (2d Cir. 1981).
119. Id. at 298.
120. Id. at 299-300.
121. In re Crowe & Assoc., 16 Bankr. 271, 273 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981), rev'd, 20 Bankr.
225 (E.D. Mich. 1982), afl'd, 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983).
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put the debtor out of business.122
In reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court concluded
that the conflict was a "labor dispute. '123 Because it concerned
payments to the employees' benefit funds, the conflict obviously
involved "terms and conditions of employment.' 1 24 A true "contro-
versy" existed even though the employer believed he was legally
justified in refusing to make the payments. 125 Furthermore, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act remained applicable even if the union's ac-
tions were illegal under the bankruptcy laws. 26 The court declined
the employer's request to accommodate the conflicting interests by
creating an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 27 The court
did acknowledge that the union may have been acting against its
own best interests because the strike could compel the debtor to
liquidate. The court reasoned, however, that it was not the courts'
role to prevent a union strike that could ultimately hurt the union
as well, and noted that the modern labor laws have long recognized
that permitting unions to strike may drive employers out of
business.
28
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed, adopting much of the district court's reasoning. 2 Citing
the Supreme Court's decisions in Order of Railroad Telegraphers
v. Chicago & North Western Railway, 30 and Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Railroad,'31 the court
held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition on federal in-
122. Id. at 274. As the bankruptcy court stated, "Norris-LaGuardia was enacted to pre-
vent courts from interfering with union conduct directed to the pursuit of the union's legiti-
mate and lawful goals. Norris-LaGuardia did not intend that unions be permitted to compel
employers to comply with unlawful and unwarranted demands." Id.
123. 20 Bankr. 225, 227 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 228-29. The court also emphasized its belief that Congress never anticipated a
conflict arising between the automatic stay provision of the Code and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Id. at 228. This conclusion seems more tenable than the Second Circuit's statement in
Petrusch that Congress's failure to address this issue was "self-evident proof" that the auto-
matic stay was not intended to supersede the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See Petrusch, 667 F.2d
297, 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
128. 20 Bankr. at 229.
129. In re Crowe & Assoc., 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
130. 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
131. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
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junctions is not inapplicable merely because the union's conduct is
unlawful under another, nonlabor statute.
1 3 2
The court also agreed with the district court that the lack of any
reference to the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act's legislative history indicated that Congress had never consid-
ered a conflict between the two statutes. Thus, Congress' adoption
of the automatic stay provision in the Bankruptcy Code did not
provide sufficient evidence that Congress intended it to supersede
the Norris-LaGuardia Act's anti-injunction provisions. 33 The court
further ruled that this situation did not fit within the Boys Mar-
kets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.1
3 4
The Sixth Circuit noted that its decision placed Crowe and Asso-
ciates in a serious dilemma because, even if the employer wanted
to comply with the union's demands, the bankruptcy court might
not permit it to do so. The court observed, however, that Crowe
and Associates had no control over many of the forces affecting its
reorganization effort, and strikes were simply other economic
forces recognized as legitimate weapons under the labor laws.
13 5
RESOLVING THE DILEMMA
Courts and commentators have proposed that federal courts re-
solve the conflict between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the auto-
matic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code in cases like Petrusch
and Crowe by balancing the policies of the statutes and determin-
ing which law should prevail in a particular case. 13 6 In order to de-
132. 713 F.2d at 214.
133. Id. at 215.
134. Id. at 215-16.
135. Id. at 216.
136. See Note, The Automatic Stay of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code Versus the Norris-
LaGuardia Act: A Bankruptcy Court's Dilemma, 61 T@x. L. REv. 321, 335 (1982) (sug-
gesting that in cases such as Petrusch the policies underlying the automatic stay provision
should prevail); see also In re Tom Powell & Son, Inc., 22 Bankr. 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1982). The court in Powell noted:
Where the activity is intended to collect a debt arising out of contract as op-
posed to an effort to vindicate statutory rights, outright abdication of jurisdic-
tion seems inappropriate. There should be a balancing of the policy considera-
tions underlying the prohibitions against self-help and preferences contained
in the Code against the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.
Id. at 660.
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termine whether this approach offers a viable solution to the con-
flict, the policy arguments on both sides of the issue must be
explored.
Strong policies favor permitting the automatic stay provision to
prevail in cases such as Petrusch and Crowe. Picketing and strik-
ing to force an employer to satisfy a prepetition debt are clearly
collection activities prohibited by section 362(a) of the Code. Fur-
ther, these activities seriously undermine the two main policies un-
derlying the automatic stay provision. First, the union's activities
could deprive the debtor of its "fresh start." If the employer is un-
able to satisfy the union's demands, prolonged picketing or striking
ultimately could force it out of business. In addition, the bank-
ruptcy court might not allow the company to comply with the
union's demands, even it it wanted to, and the debtor may be
forced to liquidate.1 3 7 Second, if the union succeeded in forcing the
employer to satisfy this debt, the union could receive an unfair ad-
vantage over other creditors. 8" This advantage would undermine
the Code's policy of equal treatment for creditors.
In addition, as the district courts in both Petrusch and Crowe
observed, a union picketing or striking an employer in the midst of
the company's reorganization effort may be acting against its own
best interests. 39 Because this activity could interfere with reorgan-
ization and increase the debtor's financial distress, it could also in-
crease the chances that union members will lose their jobs. En-
joining the action might therefore benefit the union as well as the
debtor.
Despite these arguments favoring application of the automatic
stay provision over the Norris-LaGuardia Act, persuasive reasons
also exist for courts to refrain from enjoining labor activities in
these situations. As the district court in Crowe observed, eliminat-
ing a worker's right to withhold his labor is a drastic step, and
nothing indicates that Congress intended debtors seeking protec-
tion under the bankruptcy laws to have special privileges in the
area of labor relations.140 Legislative policies and federal case law
137. In re Crowe & Assoc., 713 F.2d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1983).
138. See Note, supra note 136, at 335.
139. In re Crowe & Assoc., 20 Bankr. 225, 229 (E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Petrusch, 14
Bankr. 825, 830 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
140. Crowe, 20 Bankr. at 229.
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recognize collective labor activities as legitimate economic weapons
that ultimately could drive an employer out of business. 141 Mere
involvement in a bankruptcy reorganization plan is insufficient to
immunize the employer from the weapons of organized labor. A
financially solvent employer driven out of business by labor activi-
ties is in no better position than a bankrupt employer similarly
forced to liquidate, yet the law contemplates no immunity outside
of the bankruptcy system.
Furthermore, strikes, pickets, and boycotts are labor's only real
weapons against economic domination by employers.'42 Although
these activities are especially crippling to bankrupt employers,
much of the rationale behind freeing these employers from labor
pressures applies equally to solvent companies. The judicial excep-
tion to the Norris-LaGuardia Act proposed by the employers in
Petrusch and Crowe could lead to gradual erosion of the Act. Al-
though the National Labor Relations Act 43 and other laws protect
labor, injunctions could render much of this protection
meaningless.
Other policies favor application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in
these cases. As noted above, the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors
to reject executory contracts. Although the 1984 amendments to
the Code significantly reduce employers' ability to reject or modify
existing collective bargaining agreements, employers may still peti-
tion the bankruptcy court for permission to reject contracts under
certain conditions. 4 4 Thus, instead of seeking injunctions against
labor activities arising out of noncompliance with collective bar-
gaining agreements, debtors can seek permission to reject the labor
contracts altogether.
The strong policies supporting both sides of this conflict make a
balancing test inappropriate to determine which statute should
prevail in particular cases. Congress, not the federal courts, should
resolve the conflict. The policies favoring injunctions in cases such
as Petrusch and Crowe, may prompt Congress to amend the Nor-
141. Crowe, 712 F.2d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1983).
142. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 57, at 30 (noting "[t]he means by
which organized labor exerts economic pressure reduce themselves, in the main, to the
strike, the picket and the boycott, in their various manifestations").
143. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
144. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp. 1985).
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ris-LaGuardia Act to permit injunctions against labor activities di-
rected at debtors undergoing reorganization. Conversely, because
collective labor activities are so vital to workers, Congress could
conclude that these activities merit exemption from the Bank-
ruptcy Code's automatic stay provision. In either event, as the dis-
trict court in Crowe observed, Congress would be unlikely to alter
its long-standing anti-injunction policy without notice and exten-
sive hearings.145
Courts should not attempt to reconcile this conflict by assuming
jurisdiction specifically denied by Congress. The long history of
Norris-LaGuardia case law compels this conclusion. As noted ear-
lier, the federal courts consistently have interpreted the Norris-La-
Guardia Act broadly. With few exceptions, the courts have adhered
strictly to the provisions denying the federal courts jurisdiction to
issue injunctions in cases arising out of labor disputes. As the Milk
Wagon Drivers'4 and the Railroad Telegraphers147 cases demon-
strate, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts must con-
form to the Act's mandates even in the face of conflicts with non-
labor statutes.
The anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act also
have been held applicable in cases presenting conflicts between the
Act and the earlier bankruptcy laws, as illustrated in In re Third
Avenue Transit 48 and Bohack. 49 These cases were decided before
the enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code, but they remain
good law. Although the policies of the new Code place greater em-
phasis on protecting the debtor than did the former bankruptcy
laws, the Second Circuit probably would decide these cases the
same way today. The court in Bohack was expressly aware of the
debtors' needs and the hardships employers would face because of
the labor activities, 50 yet the court recognized the applicability of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. For the Second Circuit, the issue was a
question of law, not of policy. The Norris-LaGuardia Act specifi-
cally denied federal courts jurisdiction to issue injunctions at the
145. Crowe, 20 Bankr. at 228.
146. 311 U.S. 91 (1940); see supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
147. 362 U.S. 330 (1960); see supra text accompanying noteg 78-81.
148. 192 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1951); see supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
149. 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976); see supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
150. 541 F.2d at 318.
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time of Third Avenue and Bohack, and it continues to do so today.
Although the Supreme Court's decisions in Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen'5' and Boys Markets'52 created exceptions to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, these exceptions do not support the bank-
ruptcy courts' decisions in Petrusch and Crowe. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen presented a conflict between the Norris-La-
Guardia Act and the Railway Labor Act. In permitting the injunc-
tion against the railroad union, the Court did not conclude that the
Railway Labor Act superseded the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Rather,
the Court reconciled both statutes as parts of Congress' overall
scheme of labor legislation.
Conversely, in Petrusch and Crowe, the Norris-LaGuardia Act
conflicted with a provision in the bankruptcy laws rather than an-
other labor law. An exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act in this
situation would not have furthered congressional labor policy be-
cause the two laws are not reconcilable. Thus, the Supreme Court's
rationale in the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen is inapposite
in cases such as Petrusch and Crowe.
Similarly, Boys Markets introduced a narrow, carefully consid-
ered exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, designed to further
congressional labor policy. The decision to permit the injunction
rested largely on the Court's recognition of the shift in congres-
sional labor policy favoring administrative resolution of labor dis-
putes. Furthermore, the union previously had agreed to resolve
disputes through arbitration rather than strikes. By requiring the
union to live up to its contractual obligations, the Court enforced
congressional policy favoring the use of collective bargaining agree-
ments to define both parties' rights and obligations.
In Petrusch and Crowe, however, judicial recognition of the au-
tomatic stay provision as an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act would not have furthered the congressional policy of employ-
ing administrative techniques to resolve labor disputes. The pur-
pose of the stay is to advance the goals of the bankruptcy laws, not
those of the labor laws. Although Boys Markets promoted enforce-
ment of voluntary agreements between labor and management, the
employers in Petrusch and Crowe sought to modify their labor ob-
151. 353 U.S. 30 (1957); see supra text accompanying notes 93-103.
152. 395 U.S. 235 (1970); see supra text accompanying notes 104-112.
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ligations, while forcing the union into the position of a creditor.
Thus, the case law does not support the bankruptcy courts' deci-
sions in Petrusch and Crowe. The bankruptcy court in Crowe dis-
missed the Norris-LaGuardia Act as inapplicable because the
union's strike was "unlawful." Yet scrutiny into the legitimacy of
labor activities is the very kind of judicial'activity that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act sought to prevent."" Although the district and ap-
pellate court decisions in Petrusch and Crowe concededly place
significant hardships on the debtor, the federal courts must oper-
ate within the limits of their jurisdiction. To do otherwise would
abuse judicial power.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the auto-
matic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code cannot be resolved by
the federal courts. Absent a mandate to favor one law over the
other, courts should not attempt to invoke powers specifically re-
moved by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Courts should therefore re-
fuse to enjoin activities arising in labor disputes, regardless of the
employers' involvement in bankruptcy proceedings.
The case law supports this analysis. The federal courts have re-
peatedly denied requests to limit the Norris-LaGuardia Act in or-
der to accommodate nonlabor statutes and policies. The Supreme
Court has created narrow exceptions to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
only to further Congress' overall labor policy. Unless Congress acts
to amend this long-standing anti-injunction policy, the federal
courts remain without jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor
disputes.
NANCY L. LOWNDES
153. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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